By Col. Douglas Macgregor (Ret)
When North Korean forces crossed the 38th Parallel on June 25th, 1950, and invaded South Korea, the decision to commit armed forces to fight was so feverishly popular in DC that President Truman did not bother securing congressional approval. Of Truman’s advisors, only General Omar Bradley questioned the advisability of sending ground forces to the Korean Peninsula.
Bradley knew the US Army was too small and ill-equipped for a major war on the Asian landmass. He also feared the potential intervention of Chinese or Soviet military power could widen the war. Bradley concerns were well founded.
Victory in Korea was unattainable in large part because US Military (USM) Power then, and now, rests primarily on the strength of air and naval power. In the Eastern Hemisphere, the United States is not a major land power. American dependence on naval-aerospace dominance necessarily limits the depth and duration of large-scale military operations beyond the coastal regions of Eurasia.
Short of a nuclear strike or a million soldiers properly organized, trained and equipped for a new kind of warfare victory over Iran is virtually impossible.
Douglas Macgregor
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